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ployer, nor is the employer's claim truly his own-both derive their actions
from the employee, assumed here to be free from contributory negligence.
And the bulk of the recovery against third parties does accrue to the employee,
whatever the benefits going to the employer. If the employer's negligence
were to bar "subrogated" third party actions by him or his carrier, one of the
main incentives to such actions would disappear, with the employee the ulti-
mate loser, and with a resulting increase in the cost of compensation.
In the present case, under the existing statutes, to relieve the owner of
liability because of his remoteness or because, thus, the employer's negligence
might otherwise be forgiven, would deprive the injured employee of all com-
mon law claims, leaving him only compensation. This the court was unwilling




WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - INJURIES ARISING OUT OF
AND IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT - WHEN DOES
HORSEPLAY AMOUNT TO ABANDONMENT
OF EMPLOYMENT?
As permitted by his employer, claimant left the department where he worked
five minutes before quitting time, and went to another department for the pur-
pose of securing a ride to his home with a friend and fellow employee. The
fellow employee offered him a drink from a bottle labelled "Gin." Claimant
stepped out of sight and took a drink. The bottle in fact contained poisonous
carbon tetrachloride which the fellow employee had secured from the employer
for his personal use. Under the employer's contract with the plant union, pos-
session of or drinking liquor on the premises at any time was cause for immed-
iate dismissal. Claimant admitted that he had been given a copy of the con-
tract, but would not admit that he had read it. There had been no drinking in
the plant previously. The Workmen's Compensation Board found that claim-
ant's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. The Appellate
Division affirmed. Held (4-3): affirmed. Claimant's conduct did not amount to
an abandonment of employment as a matter of law. A violation of the no-drink-
ing rule should be treated no differently for the purposes of compensation than
the violation of any other rule designed to improve plant efficiency and to safe-
guard employees. Claimant, although he participated in the event, was an in-
nocent victim of another's horseplay. Matter of Burns v. Merritt Engineering
Co., 302 N.Y. 131, 96 N. E. 2d 739 (1951).
- The New York courts have long displayed a liberal attitude toward the ad-
ministration of the Workmen's Compensation Law. The present decision, while
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it displays again that attitude, possibly to the point of abdication, raises some
questions as to the theory underlying the allowance of awards in prank or
"horseplay" cases.
The Workmen's Compensation Law S 10 states that the employer shall com-
pensate his employees for injuries "arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment." The application of this definition to conduct commonly called "horse-
play" was established as early as 1920 in a decision by Judge Cardozo: " 'For
workmen ... to indulge in a moment's diversion from work to joke with or
play a prank upon a fellow workman is a matter of common knowledge to
every one who employs labor.' The claimant was injured not merely while
he was in a factory, but because he was in a factory, in touch with associations
and conditions inseparable from factory life. The risks of such associations
and conditions were risks of the employment." Matter of Leonbruno v. Cham-
plain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y. 470, 471, 128 N. E. 711 (1920). That case upheld
an award to a non-participating "innocent victim". But it became apparent
that all victims of horseplay would not recover when, just three years later,
the Court of Appeals held that the instigator of the horseplay, injured when his
prank backfired, could not recover. Matter of Frost v. H. H. Franklin Mfg. Co.,
236 N. Y. 649, 198 N. E. 521 (1923), affg 204 App. Div. 700, 198 N. Y. Supp.
521. See also Matter of Gaurin v. Bagley and Sewall Co., 298 N. Y. 511, 80
N. E. 2d 660 (1948). Later, it developed that this, also, was not universally
so. When it had been customary for the employees to engage in a seeming
diversion, it was held that the conduct had become an incident of the employ-
ment and injury resulting therefrom was compensable. Matter of Industrial
Commissioner (Siguin) v. McCarthy, 295 N. Y. 443, 68 N. E. 2d 434 (1946).
See also Matter of Ognibene v. Rochester Mfg. Co., 298 N. Y. 85, 80 N. E. 2d
749 (1948). Very likely, one who voluntarily participated in the prank, but who
was not the instigator of it in a true sense, would nevertheless be covered by
the above cases. He would stand in about the same position as the instigator.
Cf. Matter of McCarthy v. Remington Rand, Inc., 300 N. Y. 715, 92 N. E. 2d
58 (1950).
An attempt to fit these decisions into a workable pattern might easily
lead to differentiations hinging upon whether the claimant was the "instigator"
of the prank or an "innocent victim" or, if he was the instigator, on whether
the conduct was "customary." Cf. Note, 34 CORNELL L. Q. 460 (1949). Pos-
sibly, support for this process of categorizing can be found in the majority
opinion in this case. 96 N. E. 2d at 739. But such an approach is apt to pro-
duce distinctions which are purely superficial, since it tends to direct the
attention away from the statutory definition - injuries "arising out of ana in
thp course of" employment. The following is suggested as an alternative, 'and
seems to be supported by the decided cases. The claimant's recovery in a horse-
play case is not dependent, it would seem, upon the position which he occupies
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with relation to the prank. As to this, it may be significant that thus far there
has been no discussion in horseplay cases of the statutory exception of injuries
resulting from the wilful intention of the injured employee to bring about
injury or death of himself or another. Work. Comp. Law § 10. Cf. Matter of
Stilln'agon v. Callan Bros., Inc., 183 App. Div. 141, 170 N. Y. Supp. 677, aff'd,
224 N. Y. 714, 121 N. E. 893 (1918) (an assault case). Rather, given conduct
of the horseplay type, recovery depends upon the position in which he stands
with relation to his employment. For example, the non-participating victim
recovers because he has not left his assigned job at the time he is injured. On
the same reasoning, the instigator normally does not recover, because his act,
in the usual case, amounts to an abandonment. But sometimes he does recover.
And when he does, the reason given is that his act, though of the horseplay
type, exists under the circumstances as an incident of the employment. His
indulgence in it does not constitute an abandonment; the injury does arise "out
of and in the course of" his employment. Cf. Matter of Ognibene v. Rochester
Xtg. Co., supra, and Matter of Industrial Commissioner (Siguin) v. McCarthy,
supro. If this is the underlying theory, its application was especially necessary
in the instant case. Insofar as this claimant was injured by an entirely unex-
pected force with which he had nothing to do, he was admittedly the "innocent
victim" of another's horseplay. But that was not all. At the time he was in-
jured, he himself was engaged in activity of the horseplay type. If that amount-
ed to an abandonment of employment, he was not entitled to compensation
benefits.
It is far from clear that the court, in the instant case, did look primarily
to claimant's position with relation to his employment. There is some language
to the effect that claimant "was not injured because he violated a rule of the
plant, but, on the contrary, because he was the innocent victim of a cruel and
senseless joke." 96 N. E. 2d at 741. If, as the dissenters argue, this means that
claimant could recover merely because he was an "innocent victim", without
regard to his position at the time he became such, it would seem clearly er-
roneous. He could hardly receive an injury "arising out of" his employment if
he were not engaged in that employment, and discussions of causation would
not meet the issue. But abandonment is discussed, specifically, with regard to
violation of the rule and certainly enters into the decision.
The court's justification of the Board's finding of no abandonment involves
two extensions of earlier decisions and deserves mention. It has long been set-
tled that the violation of some rules, such as those prescribing the manner of
performance of jobs or calling for the use of safety devices, does not amount to
an abandonment of employment. See, e. g., Matter of Chila v. New York Cen-
tral R.R., 251 App. Div. 575, 297 N. Y. Supp. 850, aff'd, 275 N. Y. 585, 11 N.E.
2d 766 (1937) ; Matter of Brenchley v. International "eater Co., 227 App. Div.
831, 237 N. Y. Supp. 773, aff'd, 254 N. Y. 536, 173 N. E. 854 (1930). Here the
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court drew an analogy to those cases. Certainly the analogy is not a close one.
Claimant's act was far from a short-cut taken in his employer's business. But
cf. Matter of Wilson v. General Motors, 298 N. Y. 468, 84 N.E. 2d 781 (1949)
(recreation case). Perhaps even more significant is the treatment given the
element of forseeability of the prank, if any, in which claimant was engaged at
the time he was injured. Earlier cases allowing recovery to a claimant who was
actually engaged in a prank all involved some element of forseeability, either
because of a custom, Matter of Industrial Commissioner (Siguin) v. McCarthy,
supra, or for example, a spirit of festivity, Matter of McCarthy v. Remington
Rand, Inc., supra. In this case, that element was lacking. The court's answer
was that it was not absolutely essential, but just "important." Perhaps the
court is approaching in this indirect way the position of, Judge Desmond dis-
senting in Matter of Ognibene v. Rochester Mfg. Co., supra, that, a claimant
should recover if his act is merely an insignificant antic, even though he cn
be tabbed an "instigator."
If injuries resulting from pranks were uncommon, the court's continuing
to decide upon a distinction-by-distinction basis might be satisfactory. But such
injuries are not uncommon. And it would seem that there are "enough de-
cisions now so that, if there is an underlying theory, it could be stated. If an
"instigator" is denied recovery because he is an instigator, then the eiceptions
under which he-may be allowed to recover require fuller explanation. On the
other hand, if "instigator" serves merely to associate him with ani act amount-
ing to an abandonment, then it should be pointed out that that'is the meaning
intended and that, the reason being more basic, recovery will be-allowed, if the
act does not amount to abandonment. In dealing with these problems, the
primary consideration is the statutory test - whether the injury arose out of
and in the course of employment. Keeping this in mind, it is submitted that
the proper approach is to look primarily at the conduct in which claimant was
engaged at the time he was injured and only secondarily -at his position with
relation to the injury producing prank. The present decision, because of the
obscurity of its reasoning, probably presents no obstacle to such an approach.
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